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Such is the strange philosophy of the while man! He hews

Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities
When Is Habitat
Modification a Take?
(Part II of a two-part article)
Tara L. Mueller4

down the forest that has stood for centuries in its pride and

31

grandeur,tears up the bosom of mother earth, and causes the
silvery watercoursesto waste and vanish away. He ruthlessly
disfigures God's own pitures and monuments, and then
daubs a flat surface with many colors, and praiseshis work a
masterplece!l

I

Environmentalists nationwide cheered and breathed a
sigh of relief this past summer wheni the U.S. Supreme Court
handed down its landmark decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities ("Sweet Home). 2 In an opinion significantly reaffirming the scope and importa'nce of the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA1 3 in protecting our nation's
fish and wildlife resources, the Court reversed the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals' decisiori holding that destruction
or modification of a species' habitat may not lawfully be prohibited under the ESA.' Thus, the imminent judicial threat s
to the ESA's ability to protect species' habitat and to the
numerous habitat conservation planning processes underway nationwide has now abated. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court's opinion leaves unanswered a number of crucial
questions as to how the rule prohibiting destruction or
modification of species' habitat will be applied in particular
circumstances. Perhaps more significantly, some are arguing
that dicta in the Courts opinion indicates that the Court will
be inclined to construe the prohibition against habitat modification narrowly in the future. This article summarizes the
Sweet Home opinion and then analyzes the implications of
that decision for protection of endangered species and their
habitats. The article concludes that the ESA's prohibition
against habitat modification should not be construed narrowly, for to do so would fail to effectuate the purposes of
the ESA and cause significant hari to listed species.

0 Ms. Mueller Is a Staff Attorney with the Natural Heritage Institute. a
public Interest. non-profit natural resources law and consulting firm in San
Francisco. She is the author of the GoE TO m FEDE,. AN CA.uORNI
EN.NcRE SoEs Los (1994 & Supps. 1995. 1996). published by the
Planning and Conservation League Foundation. The author would like to

thank Macon Cowles. Esq.. Macon Cowles & Associates. Professor Brian
Gray. Hastings College of the Law. and Michael Sherwood. SeniorAttomey.
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund. for their most helpful comments and sug-

gestions on this article.
1. Sioux anecdote. In EAsn'rAu. CHAR.S. THE ltmuai Too v 149-50 (1915).
2.115 S. CL 2407 (1995).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).

4. See Tara L Mueller. Stop PBeore You Shao But Not "efbreYou Destroy: A
Critical Analysis of the D.C. Cirrulrs Decbbtn In Sweet Home Chapter of

Communities v. Babbitt. 2 \VEs-Nomms 169 (1995) ("Part 1. for a complete discussion and analysis of the Circuit Courts opinion in Sweet Home.
5. The ESA Is also underattack in Congress. which is currently considering several ESA reauthorization bills that would overturn the Supreme
Court's opinion and reinstate the D.C. Circuit's holding in Sweet Home. While
President Clinton has threatened to veto any such bill. it would be premature at best to assume a Presidential veto will save the day. A detailed discussion of the ESA reauthorization bills, however. Is beyond the scope of
this artide.

6. The USFWS Is one of the two federal agencies charged with respon-
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I. The Sweet Home Opinion
As discussed in PartI of this article, the issue in
Sweet Home was whether a United States Fish and
Wildlife Service ("USFWS") 6 regulation defining the
term "harm" in the ESA's definition of "take" to
include destruction and modification of endangered and threatened species' habitat,7 is a reasonable interpretation of the ESA. The Supreme Court
upheld the definition, for a number of reasons.
Examining the text of the ESA, the Court found
three basic reasons why the statutory language supports the reasonableness of the USFWS' interpretation of "harm." First, the Court held that the USFWS
definition of "harm" is supported by the ordinary
meaning of that term. The dictionary definition of
the verb "harm" is "to cause hurt or damage to:
injure. "8 In the context of the ESA, the Court stated,
that "definition naturally encompasses habitat
modification that results in actual injury or death to
members of an endangered or threatened species." 9
The Court, on several grounds, rejected the
landowners' argument and the D.C. Circuit's opinion that the definition of the term "harm" should be
limited to direct applications of force against a
species. First, it stated that the dictionary definition
of harm is not limited to direct or willful actions.
Second, several of the other verbs in the definition
of "take," especially "harass," "pursue" and "wound,"
may refer to actions or effects that do not require
direct applications of force. Third, the Court stated
that interpreting the word "harm" to exclude indirect injuries denies that term independent meaning
apart from the other verbs in the definition of "take,"
thus rendering it superfluous. Contrary to the D.C.
Circuit's opinion, the Court noted, the doctrine of
noscitur a sociis does not require words grouped

together in a list to be given the same or similar
meaning, but rather states that each word must
"gather[I meaning from the words around it."10 The

statutory context of the term "harm," the Court said,
"suggests that Congress meant that term to serve a
sibility for administering the federal ESA. The USFWS has jurisdiction over all terrestrial species and some marine species.
7. Specifically, the regulation provides: ihlarm in the definition of "take" in the IESAI means an act which actually kills or
iniures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or iniures wildlife by
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including
breeding, feedipg or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1992).
8. Sweet Home, 115 S.Ct. at 2412 (quoting WEBSTER's THIRD
NEw INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY
1034 (1966)).

9. Id.at 2412-13.
10. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting jarecki v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)).
1I.
Sweet Home. 15 S.Ct.at 2415.

particular function in the ESA. consistent with but
distinct from the functions of the other verbs used
to define 'take'"" The USFWS' interpretation of
"harm" as including indirect means of injuring
species is consistent with this congressional intent.
Finally, the Court noted that the D.C. Circuit's interpretation erroneously read a requirement of specific intent to take a species into the act, which is
inconsistent with the fact that a civil or criminal sec2
tion 9 violation requires only a knowing act.i
Next, the Court held that the USFIWS' definition
of "harm" is reasonable "[gliven Congress' clear
expression of the ESA's broad purpose to protect
endangered and threatened wildlife...." i3 The Court
cited two authorities in support of this conclusion.
First, the Court observed that it had previously
described the ESA as "the most comprahensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species
ever enacted by any nation."'14 It further noted that
the Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill case held that
"[tlhe plain intent of Congress... was to halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost," and that this intent "is reflected not
only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally
every section of the statute," including, section 9.15
Second, the Court cited section 1531(b) of the ESA,
which states that the fundamental purpose of the
ESA is "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems
upon which endangered species and threatened
6
species depend may be conserved."
The Court also held that Congress implicitly
affirmed the USFWS' definition of harm when It
amended the ESA in 1982 to include a permit procedure providing for the "incidental take" of a
species.17 The language of this provision, the Court
said, "strongly suggests that Congress understood
section 9 II to prohibit indirect as well as deliberate
takings."18 The Court also observed tihat the incidental take permit procedure requires a permit
applicant to prepare a detailed habitat conservation
plan which includes measures to minimize and mitigate the impact of the permitted activity on endan12. Id., see 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(1). (b)(I).

13. Sweet Home, 115 S.Ct. at 2414.
14. Id. at 2413 (quoting Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978) ("V.A. v. Hill")).
15. Sweet Home, 115 S.Ct. at 2413, (citing T'i.A. v.Hill, 437
U.S. at 184). The Court specifically referenced footnote 30 In T.VA.
v. Hill, in which it had stated in dicta that conm;truction of the
Tellico Dam would "harm" the snail darter by destroying Its last
remaining habitat.
16. Sweet Home, 115 S.Ct. at 2413 (citing 16 IU.S.C. §1531(b)).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(i){B).

18. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2414.
19. Id.
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gered and threatened species. Thus, the Court said,
this provision supports the USFWS' "conclusion
that activities not intended to harm an endangered
species, such as habitat modification, may constitute unlawful takings under the ESA unless the
[USFWSI permits them." 19
The Court found further support for its conclusions in the legislative history of the 1973 ESA. The
Court noted that, although the legislative history
does not discuss the meaning of the term "harm,"
various statements in the Committee Reports do
make clear that "Congress intended 'take' to apply
broadly to cover indirect as well as purposeful
actions." 20 The Court also found it significant that'
the term "harm" was added to the Senate version of
the ESA on the floor, noting that "lain obviously
broad word that the Senate went out of its way. to
add to an important statutory definition is precisely the sort of provision that deserves a respectful
reading."21 The Court did not find it significant that
a definition of take which included "destruction,
modification or curtailment" of a species' habitat or
range was deleted in the Commerce Committee
hearing on the ESA2 2 The Court observed that there
was no explanation of the deletion, and that the
definition was significantly broader than the USFWS
regulation. The deleted provision would have made
habitat modification a categorical violation of the
take prohibition, "unbounded by the regulations
restriction to habitat modifications that actually kill
or injure wildlife" and unqualified by "the regulation's limiting adjective 'significant' B
Finally, the Court noted that the legislative history of the 1982 amendment to the ESA, which
authorizes the USFWS to issue permits for the "incidental taking" of an endangered fish or wildlife
species, further supports the validity of the USFVS'
harm regulation. Both the House and Senate
Committee reports make clear that "Congress had
habitat modification directly in mind," since both
reports identify as the model for the incidental take
permit process a habitat conservation plan for a
housing project in California that would have

harmed the endangered Mission Blue butterfly
through development of its habitat.2 4 Further, the
House Report states that"lbly use of the word 'incidental' the Committee intends to cover situations
in which it is known that a taking will occur if the
other activity is engaged in but such taking is inci: 5
dental to, and not the purpose of, the activity."
This reference to the foreseeability of incidental takings, the court said, undermines the plaintiffs' argument that the 1982 amendment only covered accidental killings of endangered species that occur in
6
the course of hunting and trapping other animals?
The Court rejected the D.C. Circuit's holding
that section 5's grant of land acquisition authority
to the federal govemment27 and section 7's requirement that federal agenciesavoid jeopardizing listed
species and adversely modifying or destroying their
designated critical habitat 2s are the exclusive
means by which Congress intended habitat to be
protected under the ESA. As to section 5. the Court
observed that:

20. Id.at 2416 ("[Take' is defined ...
in the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way In which a person
can 'take or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife) (quoting S.
Rep. No. 307, 93d Cong.. 2d Sess. 7 (1973)). 'Take is defined In
-the broadest possible terms. 'take" indudes -harassment,
whether intentional or not. Id. at 2416 (quoting S. Rep. No. 412.
93d Cong.. 2d Sess. 11.15 (1973)).

Sess. 30-32 (1982); S. Rep. No. 418. 97th Cong.. 2d Sess. 10
(1982)).

21. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2417.
22. Id. (citing Heanngs on S. 1592 and S. 1983 Bifore 1he
Subcomm. on Environment of the Senate Subcomm. on Commerce, 93d
Cong.. Ist Sess. 27 (1973)).

Ithisl procedure allows for protection of
habitat before the seller's activity has
harmed any endangered animal, whereas
the Government cannot enforce the § 9
prohibition until an animal has actually
been killed or injured. The IUSFWSI may
also find the § 5 authority useful for preventing modification of land that is not yet
but may in the future become habitat for
an endangered or threatened species.29
The Court also distinguished section 7 from
section 9 on several grounds. In contrast to section
9, section 7 applies only to the federal government;
it imposes a broad, affirmative duty to avoid
adverse habitat modification: and it is not limited
to habitat modification that actually kills or injures
wildlife. 0 The Court deemed -unexceptional" any
overlap that sections 5 and 7 may have with section
9 in particular cases. 3i
In conclusion, the Court stated:

25. Id.at 2417 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 567. 97th Cong.. 2d
Sess. 31 (1982)).
26. Id.at 2417-18.
'27. 16 U.S.C. § 1534.
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
29. Sweet Home. 115 S. CL at 2415.
30. Id.

23. Sweet Home. 115 S. Ct. at 2417.

31. Id.

24. Id.at 2418 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 835.97th Cong.. 2d

32. Id.at 2418.
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When Congress has entrusted the
Secretary with broad discretion, we are
especially reluctant to substitute our views
of wise policy for his. See Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 865-66. In this case, that reluctance
accords with our conclusion, based on the
text, structure, and legislative history of the
ESA, that the Secretary reasonably construed the intent of Congress when he
defined "harm" to include "significant habitat modification or degradation that actu32
ally kills or injures wildlife."
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment
based on two understandings of the harm regulation. First, she stated, "the challenged regulation is
limited to significant habitat modification that
causes actual, as opposed to hypothetical or speculative, death or injury to identifiable protected
animals." Second, Justice O'Connor said, "regardless of difficult questions of scienter, the regulation's application is limited by ordinary principles
of proximate causation, which introduce notions of
foreseeability."33 These limitations caused Justice
O'Connor to "call into question" the Ninth Circuit's
ruling in Palla 11.34 However, because the plaintiffs
had only brought a facial challenge to the harm
regulation and Justice O'Connor could envision
many valid circumstances in which the regulation
might apply, she joined in the Court's opinion. Her
concurring opinion contains a very interesting discussion of her view of the regulation's purported
"particular animals," and "proximate cause" limitations, which is discussed further in the analysis
below.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Rehnquist and
Thomas, dissented. They reasoned that Congress
intended the section 9 take prohibition to prohibit
33. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
34. The Palita case cited by Justice O'Connor was actually the
last in a series of four opinions resulting from two separate
actions concerning "take of the endangered palila bird. in the
first case, plaintiffs sought to enioin the Hawaii Department of
Land and Natural Resources from maintaining feral sheep and
goat herds in the critical habitat of the endangered palila bird,
arguing that such actions violated § 9 of the ESA. Specifically,
plaintiffs contended that defendants' acts and omissions were
harming the palila by destroying and degrading its habitat, and
thereby interfering with its essential breeding, feeding and sheltering behaviors. The district court agreed, holding that the
undisputed facts clearly established a taking within the meaning
of the USFWS' harm regulation. Palla v. Hawaii Dep't of Land &
Natural Resources, 471 F.Supp. 985, 995 (D. Haw. 1979). This rulIng was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, which held that "ltlhe
defendants' action in maintaining feral sheep and goats in the
critical habitat is a violation of the IESAI since it was shown that
the pallia was endangered by the activity." Palla v. Hawaii Dep't
of Land & Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495. 497 (9th Cir. 1981)
("PalilaI-.
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only affirmative conduct intentionally directed at
particular endangered animals, such as hunting and
trapping. They contended that three features of the
USFWS harm regulation are inconsistent with their
reading of the scope of the ESA's take prohibition.
First, they stated, the regulation unlawfully dispenses with the notions of proximate cause and foreseeability, prohibiting habitat modification "that is no
more than the cause-in-fact of death or injury to
wildlife."35 Second, the dissenting Justices said the
regulation subjects persons to liability for omissions as well as affirmative acts. Third, and most
importantly, they stated that by inchlding impairment of breeding within the definition of harm, the
regulation unlawfully encompasses injury inflicted
upon populations as well as individual animals. The
dissenters explained that "[ilmpairment of breeding
does not 'injure' living creatures; it prevents them
from propagating, thus 'injuring' a population of animals which would otherwise have maintained or
36
increased its numbers."

II. Analysis of the Sweet Home Opinion: Where Are
We Now and Where Do We Go From Here?
The Court's holding finally puts to rest the critical question of whether destruction or modification
of listed species' habitat can be prolibited under
section 9, This ruling is indeed a significant victory
for proponents of the ESA. Had the Court ruled the
other way, the Act's effectiveness in preventing
habitat destruction, which is the primary cause of
species extinction3 7 and a key problem Congress
intended to address in enacting the ESA, 38 would
have been eviscerated. If the Supreme Court had
upheld the D C. Circuit's decision, habitat destruction would have been addressed almostV exclusively
through the section 7 consultation process and the
in the second Palila action, plaintiffs similarly sought to
enioin defendants from maintaining mouflon sheep herds within
the palila's critical habitat. Again, plaintiffs contended that the
sheep were causing a take of the palla by degrading and destroying its breeding, feeding and sheltering habitat. Once more, the
district court found for the plaintiffs, holding that the degradation of the palila's habitat by the sheep was "actually, presently
injuring the Palila." Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural
Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1080 (D. Haw. 10)86). This ruling
likewise was affirmed on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Palila v.
Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 852 E2d 1106, i 110
(9th Cir. 1988) ("Palila I1").
35. Sweet Home, i15 S.Ct at 2421.
36. Id.at 2422.
37. NATIONAL RESEARcH COUNCIL. SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED

SPEcIEs AcT (1995); JONES & STOKEs ASSOc., SLIDING TOWARDS
EXTINCTiON: THE STATEOF CALIFORNIA'S NATURAL HERITAGE (1987).

38. 16 U.S.C. §§1531. 1532(3); T.VA. v,Hill, 437 U.S. at 179.
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section 5 federal land acquisition authority. Neither
section is wholly effective in protecting listed
species' habitat. Section 7 applies only to formally
designated critical habitat and is only.invoked when
a federal agency action threatens to adversely modify or destroy that habitat. Moreover, funds for federal land acquisition under section 5 are inadequate
for preserving all the habitat necessary to protect
endangered and threatened species.
Absent some kind of authority to restrict habitat modifying activities of non-federal landowners,
who collectively own a large percentage of the
nation's land base, the ESA could never hope to
hold the line on extinction. A contrary ruling in the
Sweet Home case would have released these
landowners from all or nearly all liability for
destroying or modifying habitat of endangered and
threatened species. Thus, as noted in Part I of this
article, non-federal landowners would no longer
have had to prepare habitat conservation plans
and obtain incidental take permits under section
10(a) 39 for land development and other habitat
modifying activities, unless these activities would
have directly resulted in a "take." Thus, in this
broad sense, the significance of the Court's opinion cannot be overstated. There can no longer be
any question that activities that destroy or
adversely modify habitat are at least facially prohibited under the ESA, whether on federal or nonfederal lands, regardless of whether the harm to
the species can be characterized as "direct" or
"indirect."
Unfortunately, however, this general statement
offers little concrete guidance for a complex and
diverse world. Because the Sweet Home plaintiffs
were challenging the harm regulation on its face,
the Court was not adjudicating the regulation's
validity in any particular factual context. As a consequence, the Court assumed the existence of certain facts in order to decide the case. First, the
court assumed that plaintiffs had no intent to harm
endangered and threatened species by their logging activities. Second, the Court assumed that the
logging activities nevertheless would have the
effect of "detrimentally changing the natural habitat of... listed species and that, as a consequence,
members of those species will be killed or
injured."40
In light of the absence of a factual context for
the case, many critical questions remain unanswered as to how the'rule prohibiting destruction or
modification of species' habitat may lawfully be
39. 16 U.S.C. § I539(a)(2).
40. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2412.

applied in particular circumstances. It remains to be
seen how the lower courts will follow the Supreme
Court's somewhat obscure direction in Sweet Home.
Several passages in the Court's opinion seem to
imply that it may be inclined to construe the
USFWS' harm regulation narrowly if faced with a
challenge to the regulation in a particular factual
situation. This is exemplified by the following statement:
Respondents advance strong arguments
that activities that cause minimal or
unforeseeable harm will not violate the
IESAI as construed in the "harm- regulation. Respondents, however, present a
facial challenge to the regulation Icitation
omittedl. Thus, they ask us to invalidate
the Secretary's understanding of "harm" in
every circumstance, even when an actor
knows that an activity, such as draining a
pond, would actually result in the extinction of a listed species by destroying its
41
habitat.
Again, at the conclusion of the opinion, the
Court observed:
In the elaboration and enforcement of the.
ESA, the Secretary and all persons who
must comply with the law will confront difficult questions of proximity and degree;
for, as all recognize, the Act encompasses a
vast range of economic and social enterprises and endeavors. These questions
must be addressed in the usual course of
the law. through case-by-case resolution
42
and adjudication.
What follows is an analysis of some of the specific issues raised in the Sweet Home majority, concurring and dissenting opinions that will likely arise
in future "as-applied' challenges to the harm regulation.
A. When Is Habitat Modification the Proximate
Cause of Death or Injury to a Species?
An issue raised in all three Sweet Home opinions
is whether the harm regulation can and should be
read to preclude liability for habitat modification
that is not the proximate or foreseeable cause of
death or injury to a listed fish or wildlife species.
This is perhaps the only question that was clearly
41. Id.at 2414.
42. Id.at 2418.

Tara LMueller
43
answered in the affirmative by the majority.

Likewise, Justice O'Connor concurred in the majority opinion based on the explicit understanding that
liability for take only attaches to those habitat modifying activities that are the proximate cause of
harm to a species. 44 Finally, the dissenters also
agreed that take liability must be limited by ordinary principles of proximate cause, although they
disagreed that the wording of the harm regulation
45
could be read to encompass such a limitation.
It is uncertain how this proximate cause limitation will affect the application of the harm regulation in a particular case. On the one hand, one
could argue that the effect will not be too significant, since the proximate cause principle simply
46
precludes liability for "bizarre" consequences.
Proximate cause is fundamentally based on "considerations of the fairness of imposing liability for
remote consequences." 47 Viewed in this light, the
proximate cause limitation may only act to limit liability for long or attenuated chains of causation in
which it is obviously unfair to hold a landowner
liable for a taking. One such example cited by
Justice O'Connor is the "farmer whose fertilizer is
lifted by lal tornado from tilled fields and deposit48
ed miles away in a wildlife refuge."
On the other hand, as Justice O'Corinor
acknowledges, "[plroximate causation is not a concept susceptible of precise definition" and is normally decided on a case-by-case basis. 49 In other
words, what is and is not a "proximate cause" of a
43. See id. at 2412 n.9 ("Iwle do not agree with the dissent
that the regulation covers results that are not 'even foreseeable
...
no matter how long the chain of causality between modification and injury.' Respondents have suggested no reason why ...
the 'harm' regulation ...
should not be read to incorporate ordinary requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability")
(citation omitted); id.at 2414 n.13 ("Itlhe dissent incorrectly
asserts that the Secretary's regulation ... 'dispenses with the foreseeability of harm.' ... Itlhe regulation merely implements the
statute, and it is therefore subiect to the statute's 'knowingly violates' language Icitation omitted], and ordinary requirements of
proximate causation and foreseeability").
44. See id. at 2418 ('the regulations application is limited by
ordinary principles of proximate causation, which introduce
notions of foreseeability"); Id.at 2419 ("pnvate parties should be
held liable
only if their habitat-modifying actions proximately cause death or injury to protected animals); id.at 2420 ("by use
of the word 'actually,' the regulation clearly relects speculative or
coniectural effects, and thus itself invokes pnnciples of proximate
causation.... "ITIhe harm regulation applies where significant
habitat modification ...
proximately (foreseeably) causes actual
death or injury to identifiable animals") (O'Connor, I.,
concurnng)
(emphasis in original).
45. Id.at 2421, 2429-30.
46. See jerome B. Orubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co., 115 S. Ct. 1043, 1049 (1995).
47. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2420 (O'Connor, j.. concurnng);
see also WITKIN, SUMM. OV CAL. LAW,
Torts § 968 (9th ed. 1995) (rules
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particular activity is in the eye of the beholder. This
is particularly true when proximate cause is viewed
in terms of "foreseeability" (a term used in both the
majority and concurring opinions), as opposed to
"duty" or "remote" cause. That a landowner has a
duty to protect endangered and threatened species
is clearly established by the ESA. Likewise, the
determination of "remote cause" would appear to
be relatively straightforward, cutting off liability for
take only in extreme and absurd circumstances. On
the other hand, whether the adverse effects of habitat modification on a given species are deemed to
be "foreseeable" will depend upon the judge's scientific understanding of the direct relationship
between species survival and habitat preservation,
and whether the judge believes that a reasonable
person may be charged with constructive knowledge of this relationship, both in the abstract and in
the context of a particular case. 50
The open-ended nature of the proximate cause
limitation thus introduces an element of uncertainty into the "take" calculus which could result in a
more narrow application of the take prohibition
with respect to habitat modifying activities.
Moreover, because the proximate cause principle is
based primarily on notions of fairness to landowners and not on the biological needs of endangered
species and the scientific realities of the consequences of modification of a species' habitat, it
could result in fewer protections for species.5
Finally, the proximate cause principle may compliof proximate or legal cause "operate to relieve the defendant
whose conduct is a cause in fact of the iniury, where it would be
considered uniust to hold him legally responsible"),
48. Id.
49. Id.at 2420.
50. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728. 739 (1968) (conduct Is
negligent where some unreasonable risk of d)nger to others
would have been foreseen by a reasonable perscn),
51. However, there is a strong argument that, given the
Court's previous holding in T.VA. v. Hill, the proximate cause
inquiry under the ESA should not involve considerations of fairness to landowners. InT.VA v. Hill, the Suprema Court rejected
the appellants argument that the traditional "balance of hardships" test for injunctive relief should apply in ESA cases,
Instead, the Court held. "Congress has spoken In the plainest of
words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been
struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities, thereby adopting a policy which it described as 'institutionalized caution'." T.A. v. Hill. 437 U.S. at 194.
Thus, the Court enioined further construc:ion and operation of the Tellico Dam. despite the fact that construction had
nearly been completed, and that Congress had authorized such
construction and had appropriated a total of nearly $100 million
for the project. The Court acknowledged that Its holding might
not be considered "reasonable" by some, but nevertheless Insisted that, under the ESA, its function was not to substitute Its own
judgment for that of Congress. The Court stated that "Iwle have
no expert knowledge on the subiect of endangereI species, much

Winte 1996

Winter 1996

Rawd . smet Home U~r~r
Cam~uniffss
flame 11= ,rafCf comiffes

BaWl v.Sw-get

cate resolution of any case involving take of a
species through habitat modification by making
proof of harm (i.e. death or injury) to that species
more difficult. Application of the proximate cause
principle will raise new questions regarding how
close the causal connection must be between a
habitat modifying activity and harm to a species.
and how to determine whether an activity is a "substantial factor" in bringing about the harm (especially where there are multiple causes of such
52
harm).
The potential risk to species posed by the proximate cause principle is illustrated by several
excerpts from the Court's opinions. For example.
both Justice O'Connor and the dissenting Justices
appear to agree that application of the proximate
cause principle would preclude liability for "a farmer
who tills his field and causes erosion that makes silt
run into a nearby river which depletes oxygen and
thereby liniures] protected, fish."' 3 While this may
seem like an attenuated chain of causation to some,
the close connection between the farmer's activity
and the injury to protected fish is obvious to anyone
with even a minimal understanding of basic ecology. To the latter group, imposing take liability on the
farmer would likely seem fair, particularly if the
farmer could alter his or her farming practices to
reduce erosion and thereby eliminate or minimize
harm -to the fish.' 4 When one considers that the

overall purpose of the ESA is to "halt and reverse
the trend towards species extinction, whatever the
cost,"5" the farmers liability can hardly be questioned. Nevertheless, at least four Supreme Court
Justices would not find liability in this circumstance.
and it is therefore likely that some lower courts
would not either.
Justice O'Connor also w6uld not find liability in
a factual situation similar to the Palia 11case.5 6 As
discussed in Part I of this article, in Palita 1. plaintiffs
sued the Hawaii Department of Land and Natural
Resources to enjoin it from maintaining a herd of
mouflon sheep in the habitat of the endangered
palila bird. The sheep ate the young, tender shoots
of the mamane tree. upon which the palila depended for its survival. The sheep prevented the mamane
trees from regenerating, thus leading to continued
degradation of the palila's habitat. The evidence at
trial showed that there was a reasonable scientific
certainty that this habitat degradation would drive
the palila to extinction. 57 The Ninth Circuit held this
evidence sufficient to establish a taking of the palila
bird under the USFWS' harm regulation.5
In her concurring opinion, however, Justice
O'Connor indicated that the proximate cause and
foreseeability limitations "call into question" the
Ninth Circuit's reading of the scope of the harm regulation. She explained:

less do we have a mandate from the people to strike a balance of
equities on the side of the Tellico Dam." Id.
In light of the ESAs strong policy of institutionalized caution" and the Court's holding in T.V.A v.Hill, both of which require
the balance of equities to be struck in favor of protecting endangered species, courts should not be able to cut off § 9 liability
simply on the basis that holding the landowner liable would be
'unfair.' since this determination has nothing to do with protection of species. Rather, liability should only be circumscribed In
cases where there is an intervening cause of harm or a similar
clear break in the chain of causation.
52. See. e.g.. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. United States Dep't
of the Navy. 898 E2d 1410. 1420 (9th Cir. 1990) (evidence didnot
establish that Navy's annual diversions upstream from Pyramid
Lake. which lowered the lake level, was the cause of decline In
population of endangered cui-ui fish in Pyramid Lake. Moreover.
evidence failed to distinguish the impacts resulting from the
Navy's diversions from other diversions, including the plaintiffs
own).
53. Sweet Home. 115 S. Ct. at 2420. 2423.
54. Indeed, this is the very purpose of the 'incidental take"
permit procedure enacted by Congress In 1982. 16 U.S.C.
§I539(a)(1)(B). As discussed in section I of this article, the Court
itself concluded that Congress enacted § 10(a) specifically to provide an exception to the § 9 take prohibition as It applied to habltat modifying activities. Sweet Home. 115 S. Ct..at 2418. Under the
§ iO(a) procedure, any person may apply for a permit to Inddentally -take' species lawfully, provided he or she prepares a habltat conservation plan specifying, among other things: (1) the likely impacts of the taking; (2) steps the applicant will take to monitor, minimize and mitigate these impacts; and (3) alternatives

that were considered and why these alternatives were reiected. 16
U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A). The USRVS must approve the permit
application If It finds that: (I) the taking Is Incidental to an otherwise lawful activity; (2)the applicant will minimize and mitigate
the Impacts of the taking to the maximum extent practicable; and
(3) the taking will "not appreciably reduce the likelihood of survival and recovery of the species In the wild." 16 U.S.C. 4
1539(a)(2)(B).
The fact that this Incidental take permit procedure exists.
and the maxim prohibiting a reading of a section of statute which
would render another section of that statute superfluous, both
counsel against a restricted reading of the scope of the take prohlbltion. It is significant that the standard for granting an inadental take permit Is the equivalent of the § 7 "no Jeopardy standard (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 835). which Is less stringent that the
'take" prohibition. See Paul D.Ort. What Dczs ItTake to TakeandXVJat
Don It Ta e to lepardiuz?7TuL&E Etrat LI. 197, 209, 215 (1993). if
the § 9 take prohibition Is Interpreted, through the proximate
cause lIlmItation, to precWfie liability for many types of habitatmodifying activities which have adverse effects on (i.e. jeopardize
the continued existence of) listed species, this would render the
§ 10(a) permit procedure a nullity. Because the 10(a) permit procedures allows an exception to the § 9 take prohibition, the take
prohibition must be more stringent than the standard for granting such a permit, otherwise the permit procedure makes no
sense.
55. T.VA v.Hill. 437 U.S. at 184.
56. Palil2 II.852 F2d 1106.
57. PaliLz. 649 E Supp. at 1075.
58. Patil HI.
852 E2d at 1110.
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[iln my view, then, the "harm" regulation
applies where significant habitat modification, by impairing essential behaviors,
proximately (foreseeably) causes actual
death or injury to identifiable animals that
are protected under the IESAI. Pursuant to
my interpretation, Palla I-under which
the [Ninth Circuit] Court of Appeals held
that a state agency committed a "taking" by
permitting feral sheep to eat mamane-naio
seedlings that, when full grown, might have
fed and sheltered endangered palila
[birdsl-was wrongly decided according to
the regulation's own terms. Destruction of
the seedlings did not proximately cause
actual death or injury to identifiable birds;
it merely prevented the regeneration of forest land not currently inhabited by actual
birds.' 9
Although this statement appears to reflect a
fundamental misunderstanding of the facts of Palila
11,60 it nevertheless vividly highlights the negative
biological impact that application of the proximate
cause and foreseeability requirements could have
on section 9 cases. If lower courts adopt an
approach similar to Justice O'Connor's, these limitations would preclude a finding of liability for
degradation of habitat that is currently unoccupied,
but which could or might be utilized by a species on
the basis that the requisite degree of causation was
not established.6 Of course, as any biologist knows,
the fact that habitat is not currently occupied by a
59. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2420-21 (O'Connor. j.. concur60. The undisputed facts in the Palila cases were that the
pallia bird's entire known population (about 2,200 birds in 1986)
was limited to the remaining mamane-naio forests, and the bird
occupied about 10% of its historical range. The experts agreed
that the palla was dangerously close to extinction, and that all
remaining mamane forest was essential for the bird's survival.
Under these circumstances, any further degeneration of the forest was bound to cause death or injury to existing individual
birds, not merely prevent future occupation of "potential habitat"
by presently nonexistent birds. Palia, 471 F. Supp. at 988-90.
61. See, e.g. Sweet Home. 115 S. Ct. at 2415 (4 5 distinguishable
from § 9 in part because 4 5 can be used to prevent modification
of land not currently occupied by a species); Morrill v. Luian, 802
F. Supp. 424, 431-32 (S.D. Ala 1992) (holding that plaintiff had
failed to establish causal link between development of endangered Perdido Key beach mouse's habitat and harm to mouse in
part because there was no evidence that the mouse actually
occupied the habitat).
62. NATIONAL REsEARCH COUNCIL, Preface to SCIENCE AND THE
ENDANGERED SpEciEs Ac' (1995).
63. See, e.g., Morrill, 802 F Supp. at 431 (holding that unlaw.ful take of species not shown where habitat unoccupied, even
though USFWS had concluded in a biological opinion that
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species does not necessarily mean that it is not crucial to the species' survival. 62 But proving this connection may be difficult. 63 Furthermore, Justice
O'Connor's view of the proximate cause principle
implicitly sanctions piecemeal destruction of a
species' habitat, leading to "death by a thousand
cuts."
Finally, all nine Justices appear to agree that
proximate cause is established, and therefore liability for "take" is appropriate, in circumstances where
an individual destroys the last remaining habitat of
the species (thereby causing its extinction), or an
individual member of a species is directly killed by
a habitat-modifying action (i.e. through cutting
down a tree in which a bird is nesting).6 4 However, if
the proximate cause standard limits liability for
habitat modification to these narrow circumstances, the term "harm" would practically be read
out of the statute altogether, since a,iy injury that
does not rise to the level of death (unless intentionally directed at a particular animal) would not
be the proximate cause of the activity in question.
Such a restricted reading of the harm regulation
almost certainly would not be supported by the
majority and concurring Justices, however, since it
essentially resurrects the D.C. Circuit opinion overturned in Sweet Home case.
A better causation standard, at least in cases
involving civil and criminal penalties, is actual, or
"but for," cause. 65 The actual cause inquiry asks
whether a particular habitat modifying activity has
"some prohibited impact" on an endangered
66
species (i.e. "actually kills or injures" that species).
destruction of this habitat would jeopardize the continued existence of the mouse pursuant to § 7).

64. The dissenting justices would add the further requirement that the actor possess a specific intent to take the species
In question. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2424; see atso Id.at 2414-15
n.i 5 ("ulnder the dissent's interpretation of the Act, a developer
could drain a pond, knowing that the act would extinguish an
endangered species of turtles, without even proposing a conservation plan or applying for a permit under j§1 0a)l; unless the
developerwas motivated by a desire 'to get at a turtle'..., We cannot accept that limitation"); Id. at 2420 ("the landowner who
drains a pond on his property, killing an endangered fish In the
process, would likely satisfy any formulation of the Iproximate
causel pnnciple") (O'Connor, J., concurring); Id.at 2424 ("to chop
down the very tree in which Ian animall Is ne!,ting, or even to
destroy its entir6 habitat in order to take it (as by draining a pond
in order to get at a turtle), might neither wound nor kill, but
would directly and intentionally harm") (Scalia, I., dissenting).
65. Use of the "but for causation standard Is problematic In
cases involving Injunctive relief due to difficulties In proving that
a prospective activity will be the future "cause in fact" of harm to
a species.
66. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Administiator, E.P.A,, 882
F.2d 1294, 1300-01 (8th Cir. 1989) ("jal taking occurs when the
challenged activity has 'some prohibited Impact on an endangered species'") (quoting Palila I,639 F.2d at 497).
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By contrast, the proximate cause inquiry is based

on an unpredictable, non-biological policy analysis.
performed on a case-by-case basis. Relying on such
a policy-based analysis to limit liability for harm is
inappropriate when Congress has already made the
hard policy choice: that protecting listed species is
"to be afforded the highest of priorities."67 Under
these circumstances, it is improper for the courts to
arrogate to themselves the authority to limit an
individual's liability for harming a species for nonbiological reasons, through the uncertain vehicle of
a proximate cause standard. If a habitat modifying
activity is the actual cause of harm to a listed
species (i.e. death or injury), liability should attach.
The circumstances under which habitat modification may be deemed to "actually kill or injure" a
species are discussed below.
B. When Does Habitat Modification "Actually Kill
or Injure" a Species?
The USFWS harm regulation expressly limits
take liability to those habitat modifying activities
which "actually kill[I or injure wildlife."6 8A key issue
after the Sweet Home opinion is how the actual injury
requirement will be interpreted and applied in specific cases. This issue involves several subissues,
each of which is addressed below: (1)Does future or
threatened habitat modification satisfy the "actual.
injury" requirement?; (2) If so, what degree of risk
must be posed by the threatened future harm and
how imminent must the threat be?; (3) What is
"actual injury" in the context of habitat modification? Is impairment of a species' chances of recovery sufficient, or must a decline in the number of
individual members of the species be shown?; (4)
May actual death or injury through habitat modification be proven by reference to population statistics, or must one demonstrate harm to identifiable
individual animals?; and (5)what type and extent of
habitat modification will result in a finding of actual death or injury" Interestingly, depending upon
which way a given fact pattern is analyzed, all of
67. T.VA v. Hill. 437 U.S. at 174: accord Sierra Club v. Marsh,
816 F.2d 1376. 1383 (9th Cir. 1987) (Congress -decided that the

balance of hardships and the public interest tips heavily in favor
of endangered species [citation omittedl. We may not use equlty's scales to strike a different balance.'); see also United States v.
Glenn-Colusa 1ig. Dist., 788 RSupp. 1126, 1132 (E.D. Cal. 1992)
(-an analysis and weighing of competing [social and economicl
considerations is precluded by the IESAI and has already been
undertaken by Congress).
68. 50 C.ER. § 17.3.

69. Sweet Home, 115 S.Ct.at 2412 n.9, 2415.
70. Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co.. 50
F.3d 781. 787 (9th Cir. 1995) (the term "actual' injury Is Intended

to specify the "degree of certainty that harm would befall a pro-
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these issues also can be reframed as proximate
cause problems.
I. Does threatened future habitat modification qualify
as "actual injury"?
The majority opinion in Sweet Home provides
minimal guidance on the question whether threatened future harm qualifies as actual injury. The
majority simply observed that, by its own terms, the
USFWS harm regulation only applies in circumstances where the activity in question "actually
harms" a species. It is nbt clear how literally the
Court is inclined to read the "actual harm" limitation. The Ninth Circuit has held that this limitation
does not preclude suits to enjoin prospective harm
to a species, provided the harm is at least reasonably certain to occur.70 One passage in the Sweet
Home opinion, however, raises the question whether
the Court would agree that the Ninth Circuit's reading of the harm regulation is a reasonable construction of section 9's take prohibition. In distinguishing section 5's land acquisition authority from section 9's take prohibition, the Court stated: "the § 5
procedure allows for protection of habitat before the
seller's activity has harmed any endangered animal,
whereas the Government cannot enforce the § 9
prohibition until an animal has actually been killed or
injured. 7'
It is difficult to predict how much weight courts
faced with an "as-applied' challenge to the USFWS
harm regulation will give this statement. On the one
hand, the passage appears to conflict with the holdings of those courts that have considered the precise question whether section 9 may be used to
enjoin prospective harm toaa speciesY2 On the other
hand, however, the statement is merely dicta and
therefore was not made in a context in which the
Court was required to consider all of the ramifications of its opinion. Indeed, the Court did not seem
to have the ESKs injunctive relief provisions, which
specifically authorize suits by a private citizen or the
U.S. Attorney General to prevent prospective harm,
tected species, as opposed to the timing of the Injury: therefore.
the ESA authorizes citizens to seek an Injunction against an
imminent threat of harm to a protected species): National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington Northern R.R.. 23 F3d 1508, 1511 (9th
air. 1994) (in order to obtain an Inlunction under § 9 of the ESA,

citizen plaintiff -must prove that there Isa reasonable likelihood
of future [harml*).
71. Swit Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2415 (emphasis added).
72. Fores Conseratlon Council, 50 F3d 781: National Widife
Fern. 23 E3d 1508. set also American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti. 9 F3d

163. 166 list Cir. 1993) (Injunctive relief may be granted Ifactivity'wiU actually... cause harm to the species') (emphasis added).
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in mind at all. 73 All references in the opinion are to

the civil and criminal penalty provisions 7 4 Even the
Ninth Circuit has held that a threat of harm is insuf75
ficient to sustain civil or criminal penalties
Finally, the majority may have been using the
phrase "actual injury" to preclude section 9 liability
for "hypothetical or speculative" injury (but not nec76
essarily imminent or likely prospective injury).
Section 5 authorizes the Government to acquire
land for endangered species protection without
making any showing that land acquisition will forestall future harm to the species. By contrast, the
"actual injury" requirement of the section 9 harm
regulation does require a showing that a habitat
modifying activity has caused or is likely to cause
death or injury to a species. As the Ninth Circuit has
explained:
The [USFWS'sj use of the term "actually" [in
the harm regulation] was not intended to
foreclose claims of an imminent threat of
injury to wildlife. Rather, because the
IUSFWSI was concerned that the joriginall
definition of "harm" could be read to mean
habitat modification alone, the IUSFWSI
inserted the phrase "actually kills or injures
wildlife" to preclude claims that only
involve habitat modification without any
attendant requirement of death or injury to
protected wildlife.
(Defendant] points out that lplaintiff'sl
73. Forest Conservation Council, 50 E3d at 785 (citing 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(e)(6) and (g)(1)). Certainly, the Court was not thinking of
the ESA's citizen suit provision, given its reference to "the
Government."
74. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(1 ) and (b)(1) provide that "lalnyperson who knowingly violates" any provision of the ESA or its
implementing regulations shall be liable for specified civil and/or
criminal penalties. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(e)(6) and (g)(i)(A). by contrast, authorize the U.S. Attorney General or any person to "seek
to enjoin any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of any
provision" of the ESA or its implementing regulations.
75.Forest Conservation Council, 50 F.3d at 786 n.3.
76. See 115 S. Ct. at 2418 ("the challenged regulation is limited to significant habitat modification that causes actual, as
opposed to hypothetical or speculative, death or injury to identifiable
protected animals") (O'Connor, I.. concurnng) (emphasis added).
77. Forest Conservation Council, 50 F.3d at 787 (quoting 46 Fed.
Reg. 54,748-49 (1981)); accord National Wildlife Fed'n, 23 F.3d at 1512
and n.8 ("lwlhile we do not require that future harm be shown
with certainty before an inlunction may issue, we do require that
a future injury be sufficiently likely'. "what we require is a definitive threat of future harm to protected species, not mere speculation") (emphasis in original); compare Amencan Bald Eagle v. Bhatti,
9 F.3d at 166 ("courts have granted injunctive relief only where
petitioners have shown that the activity ... will actually, as
opposed to potentially, cause harm to the species"). The difficulty with distinguishing between a "definitive" or "imminent" threat
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claim is barred because the IUSF1SJ noted
that a claim for a "potential injury" to
wildlife would not be actionable. The word
"potential" means "existing in pcssibility,"
Thus, "potential injury" denotes only injury
that may or may not occur. In contrast,
[plaintiff] alleges that Idefendant'sl project
creates an imminent threat of death or
injury to Ian endangered speciesi. The
word "imminent" means "ready to take
place; near at hand." The two assertions are
clearly distinct ...[Clourts have conclud-

ed that the IuSFWSI juxtaposed Ihe terms
"actually" and "potentially" to specify the
degree of certainty that harm would befall
a protected species, as opposed to the tim77
ing of the injury.
The propriety of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the "actual injury" limitation is borne out by
the Sweet Home Court's affirmation of T.V.A. v. Hill (a
case in which harm to an endangered species was
imminently threatened, but had not yet actually
occurred),78 as well as by the Court's factual
assumptions in the case.7 9 Interpreting section 9 to
require a showing of wholly past or present, ongoing harm would be "contrary to the letter and spirit"
of the ESA.80 Moreover, as a practical matter, such
an interpretation would lead to the absurd result
that a citizen suit to enjoin a section 9 violation
would be rendered moot before it became ripe.8t
The meaning of the "actual injury" requirement
versus "speculative" or "potential" harm, Is discussed below,
78. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2413-14 ("illn Hill. we construed
section 7 as precluding the completion of the Tellico Dam
because of its predicted Impact on the survival of the snail darter
Icitation omittedi.... Although the section 9 'take' prohibition
was not at issue in Hill. we took note of that prohibition: placing
particular emphasis on the Secretary's Inclusion of habitat modification in his definition of 'harm,' In light of that provision for
habitat protection, we could 'not understand how TVA Intends to
operate Tellico Dam without 'harming' the snail larter") (quoting
T.VA. v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 184 n.30).
79. Id. at 2412 (ilwle must assume arguendo that Iloggingl
activities will have the effect ... of detrimentaly changing the natural habitat of ... listed species and that, as a consequence,
members of those species will be killed or injured. Under respondents' view of the law, the Secretary's only means of forestalling
that grave result--even when an actor kno vs it is certain to occur-is to
use his section 5 authority to purchase lands upon which the survival of the species depends. The Secretary, or, the other hand,
submits that the section 9 prohibition on takings, which
Congress defined to include 'harm,' places on repondents a duty
to avoid harm that habitat aleration will cause the birds unless
repondents first obtain a permit pursuant to section 10")(emphasis added).
80. Forest Conservation Council, 50 F3d at 785
81. Id.
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is the primary issue before the Ninth Circuit in the
82
appeal of Marbe Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Company.
In that case, plaintiffs sought to enjoin implementation of a plan to harvest timber on a 137-acre parcel of old growth forest in Humboldt County on the
ground that the timber harvest would "take," i.e.
"harm" and "harass," the threatened marbled murrelet by destroying its habitat. The court held an
eight-day non-jury trial to determine whether the
murrelet occupied the timber stand at issue and if
so, whether the harvest would in fact result in a
"take." In its findings of fact and conclusions of law,
the courtanswered both of these questions in the
affirmative and permanently enjoined the proposed
timber harvest.
The court found that plaintiffs had met their
burden of establishing that the proposed harvest
will harm and harass the murrelet because the "logging activities will result in the destruction and
degradation of occupied Imurreletl habitat, such
that marbled murrelets will actually be killed or
injured by the logging operations" through significant impairment of their breeding, feeding and
sheltering behavior8 3 The court cited the following
facts in support of this conclusion:
(1) The timber harvest plan's proposed
removal of 40-60% of the old growth trees
on the site "will significantly impair the
marbled murrelets' breeding behavior,"
thus decreasing the chance of successful
nesting.8 4
(2) Removal of 40-60% of the old growth
trees "Will result in loss of a substantial
portion of the nesting opportunities" for
murrelets returning to the area from sea to
nest.8 5 Returning murrelets will become
disoriented, and will be subjected to
increased competition. Nest sites that do
remain will be degraded and substandard.
As a consequence, many murrelets will
likely fail to find suitable nest sites, and
those that do may not be able to successfully raise their young.
(3) The resulting open and fragmented
82. 880 E Supp. 1343 (N.D. Cal. 1995). appeal docketed, No.
95-16504 (9th Cir. Nov. 6, 1995).
83. id. at 1365-66.
84. Id. at 1366.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.at 1367 (citing National Wildlife Fe4'n. 23 F3d at 1512.
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nest canopy will significantly increase the
likelihood of avian predation.
(4) The subsequent inevitable decline in
the murrelet population "will result in a
high probability that the remaining population of marbled murrelets in this region
will become extinct." 6
Based on these facts, the court concluded that
plaintiffs had demonstrated a "definite threat of
future harm to the marbled murrelet sufficient to
warrant imposition of a permanent injunction s7
Pacific Lumber Company is now seeking to overturn
the district court's opinion, inter alia, on the ground
that a plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief
under the ESA unless he or she proves that harm to
a species has already been sustained or is currently
being sustained. In support of this contention.
Pacific Lumber cites the paragraph in Sweet Home
wherein the Court distinguishes between the section 9 take prohibition and the section 5 land acquisition authority on the'basis that the former only
applies "once an animal has actually been killed or
injured."3 Pacific Lumber asserts that plaintiffs
failed to meet this standard because they offered no
proof that "any specific marbled murrelet had 'actually been killed or injured' by timber harvesting....
Rather, Iplaintiffsl offered evidence of theoretical or
possible future harm to unidentified birds."89
In their opposition brief, plaintiffs (appellees)
argue, infer alia, that the phrase "actual injury"
implies nothing about the timing of the injury, but
was included in the harm regulation simply to preclude a claim that habitat modification alone, without attendant death or injury (whenever that injury
may occur), violates the take prohibition. 0 Further,
they argue, the Sweet Home Court's statement cannot
reasonably be read to preclude claims of future
injury since it clearly refers to the government's
enforcement of the ESAs penalty provisions. As
such, plaintiffs say, the Court's statement does not
apply to the provisions authorizing a citizen or the
government to seek injunctive relief, which were
enacted for the specific purpose of preventing harm
to species before it occurs. 91
The plaintiffs' arguiment is clearly the more rea88. S'uI Home. 115 S.Ct. at 2415.
89. Brief for Appellant at 14-15. Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific
Lumber Co.. No. 95-16504 (9th Cir. 19951.
90.46 Fed. Reg. 54.748 (1981) (to be codified at 50 C.FR. § 17).
91. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(e)(6). (g)(i). See S. Rep. No. 97-418.
97th Cong.. 2d Sess. 24 (1982) ('li]nlunctions provide greater
opportunity to attempt resolution of conflicts fefore
m to a
spedes cacus .... The ability to enjoin a prospectke violation of the
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sonable interpretation of the ESAs take prohibition.
Pacific Lumber's reading of the statute would lead
to the absurd result that a citizen could not sue to
enjoin a take until after it is too late to protect the
species from such immenent harm. Moreover, as
plaintiffs point out, Pacific Lumber's interpretation
of the Sweet Home decision would overrule sub silento
T.V.A. v. Hill, which involved prospective harm.
However, given the Sweet Home Court's favorable reference to the T.V.A. v. Hill opinion in the context of
the habitat modification issue, such a result could
not have been intended. In Sweet Home, the Court
characterized the holding in T.V.A. v. Hill in the following manner:
In Hill, we construed § 7 as precluding the
completion of the Tellico Dam because of
its predicted impact on the survival of the
snail darter [citation omitted]. ... Although
the § 9 "take" prohibition was not at issue
in Hill, we took note of that prohibition,
placing particular emphasis on the
[USFWS'I inclusion of habitat modification
in [itsl definition of "harm." In light of that
provision for habitat protection, we could
"not understand how TVA intend[edi to
operate Tellico Dam without harming the
92
snail darter.
Therefore, neither Sweet Home nor the "actual
injury" requirement preclude suits to enjoin
prospective harm to an endangered or threatened
species.
2. What degree of risk justifies a finding of actual
harm?
If the ESA permits suits to enjoin prospective
harm to a species, the next difficult and unanswered
question is the degree of risk that must be posed by
a given activity before an injunction will issue. In
PalilaII, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
an activity that could harm a species may properly be
enloined as a violation of the take prohibition. 93The
court rejected the defendants' argument that only
Act rather than the ability only to prosecute a completed violation will better serve the interests of the public, the potential violator and the potentially harmed species") (emphasis added).
92. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2413 (quoting T.vA. v. Hill, 437
U.S. at 184 n.30 (emphasis added)).
93. Paulia II,852 F.2d at 1108.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 50 F.3d at 784; accord NationalWildlife Fed'n, 23 F.3d at 1512
("Iwlhile we do not require that future harm be shown with certainty before an iniunction may issue [under § 91, we do require

activities that would "result in the immediate destruction of the palila's food sources" satisfy the "actual4
9
injury" limitation of the USFWS harm regulation.
The court reasoned that the harm regulation's inclusion of habitat destruction which could or is likely to
result in death or injury to a species is consistent
with the overall purposes of the ESA to provide a
means for conserving the ecosystems upon which
threatened and endangered species depend for survival. 95 More recently, in Forest Conseivation Council,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed its prior conclusion, holding that a violation of the take prohibition may be
established where the threat of future injury is "reasonably certain" to occur.9
Although the "likelihood of future harm" issue
is not directly addressed in the Sweet Home majority
opinion, the Court does assume that the plaintiffs'
habitat modifying activities would have the effect of
killing or injuring listed species.9 7 In addition, as
mentioned previously, the Court also cites approvingly to T.V.A. v. Hill, a case in which destruction of
an endangered species' last remaining habitat was
virtually certain to harm that species. Further, in
rejecting the plaintiffs' facial challenge to the harm
regulation, the Court stated: "they ask us to invalidate the IUSFWS'l understanding of 'harm' in every
circumstance, even when an actor k-iows that an
activity, such as draining a pond, would actually result
in the extinction of a listed species by destroying its
habitat." 98
Some might contend that these aspects of the
Sweet Home opinion portend a ruling requiring a
degree of certainty of future harm contrary to the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the actual harm limitation. However, it is difficult to place this much
weight on the Supreme Court's statements. First, the
Court does not directly address the degree of risk to
a species that must exist in order for the take prohibition to be invoked. Second, a literal i'eading of the
Court's statements is inconsistent with other portions of the opinion wherein the Court explicitly
rejects an interpretation that limits the take prohibition to actions which directly kill or injure listed
species.99 Only direct harm satisfies a reading of the
that future harm be sufficiently likely') (emphasis In original),
However, the Ninth Circuit, like Justice O'Connor In her concurring'opinion, has cautioned that "mere speculation" will not suffice. NationalWildlife Fed'n. 23 F.3d at 1512 n.8 ("what we require Is
a definitive threat of future harm to a protected species, not mere
speculation").
97. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2412.
98. Id. at 2414; see also Amencan Bald Eagle, 9 F.3d at 166
("courts have granted injunctive relief only where petitioners
have shown that the alleged activity ...
if continued will actually,
as opposed to potentially, cause harm to the species"),
99. See. e.g., Sweet Home, 115 S.Ct. at 2413 ('unless the statu-
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take prohibition which requires proof of certain death
or injury. This is because it cannot be proven with
100% certainty that harm will necessarily occur
unless the activity will result in: (1)immediate death
(as when a bulldozer crushes a member of a species
or destroys its last remaining habitat); or (2) immediate destruction of all the species' remaining food
sources or breeding sites. The latter types of activities ultimately lead to certain death by starvation or
failure to reproduce.
Finally, the Sweet Home Court's references to certain future harm must be viewed in the context in
which these statements are made. The Court is
merely using an extreme example for purposes of

illustrating the absurdity of invalidating the USFWS
harm regulation in the context of a facial challenge.
In such circumstances, a court is required to uphold

a regulation unless there is "no set of circumstances
...
under which the Iregulation] would be valid." °O
If section 9 is read to require an absolute certainty of harm before liability will attach, this will
fail to effectuate the ESAs purposes. By definition,
an endangered species is on the brink of extinction.

Therefore, "it should not be necessary for it to dip.
closer to extinction before the prohibitions of section 9 come into force." 0i As the district court stated in Defenders of Wildlife v.Administrator, E.P.A.,
"Itihere is no level of threat that can be deemed
'insignificant' absent an incidental take Ipermitl." 02
Moreover, limiting the take prohibition to cases
where death or injury is certain to occur would lead
to the bizarre result that an activity which would
jeopardize the continued existence of the entire
species under section 7 nevertheless would not
constitute a take of any individual member of the

species in violation of section 9! Such was the D.C.
District Court's remarkable conclusion in North Slope
Borough v. Andrus.10 3 In that case, the court enjoined
proposed offshore oil leasing activities under sectory term 'harm' encompasses indirect as well as direct Injuries.
the word has no meaning that does not duplicate the meaning of
the other words in the definition of 'take'); id. at 2414 (the § 10(a)
incidental take permit procedure "strongly suggests that
Congress understood j§91 to prohibit indirect as well as deliberate takings').
IGO. Reno v. Flores, 113 S.Ct. 1439. 1446 (1993).
101. Pali/a
1.649 F.Supp. at 1077.
102.688 F Supp. 1334, 1354 (D. Minn 1988), affd. Inpar. rrv"d
in part, 882 F.2d 1294 (8th CiL 1989); see also Fo est Consen'allon
Council. 50 E3d at 74 ('lilt is clearly conceivable that one could
inflict great harm on a protected species by creating an Imminent
threat of harm to that species. Such a threat therefore falls easily within the broad scope of Congress' definition of 'take").
Significantly, the definition of -take" includes any attempt to take a
species, which by definition poses a threat of future harm. 16
U.S.C. § 1532(19).
103. 486 F Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1979), afd. in part, rv'd. In par,
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tion 7. but refused to do so under section 9, stating
that the government is not required to
halt all activity merely because there is a
possibility that agency action will result in
a "taking" at some future time ... . [lnjunctive relief should not herein issue unless
danger to the protected species is sufficiently imminent or certain .... The lease
sale itself threatens no species.104
Finally, as a leading ESA commentator has
stated, there is
no rational reason to consider future
adverse impacts to endangered species as
not constituting takings merely because
they do not affect species immediately ....
lit makes sensel to halt or modify activities
as early as possible before takings occur,
both to benefit endangered species and to
avoid the potential waste of resources on
an activity which may be enjoined in the
future when a taking becomes imminent. 10S
The degree of risk of future harm required to
invoke the take prohibition is a key issue in the
Marbled Murrelet appeal. Pacific Lumber is arguing
that, assuming the "actual injury" requirement can
be read to proscribe prospective harm, that harm
must be certain to occur. In other words, Pacific
Lumber contends, a plaintiff cannot obtain injunctive relief under section 9 unless he or she proves
that the activity being challenged will in fact kill or
injure particular members of the species.'1 As
Pacific Lumber's bnef demonstrates, if future harm
must be conclusively demonstrated, this would
require a defacto showing that the habitat modifyifig
activity would directly harm a species.iO 7
642 E2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
104. North S.pz Borougi. 486 F.Sopp. at 362; accord California
v. Watt. 520 . Supp. 1359. 1387 (C.D. Cal. 1981),.ald. on other
grounds, 683 E2d 1253 (9th Cir. 19821 (l'alssuming arguendo that
the proposed leasing activities do constitute a threat to the continued survival of species protected by Ithe ESAI, such a threat
would still not constitute a taking}.
105. DANiEL ROHLF, THE Etu cERED SF.Es AcT: A GUi" To
Irs PTEots.;o L.uix. rDatO:i 61-62 (1989).
106. See Appellants Opening Bnef at 18-23. Marbled
Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co.. No. 95-16504 (9th Cir. 1995).
107. Pacific Lumbers opening brief reads the take prohibition as narrowly as the dissenting lustices and the overturned
D.C. Circuit opinion In Swreet Hor. Pacific Lumber states:
The timber harvest Is scheduled to occur after the birds
breeding season when they are at sea and not present in
the stand. Hence, any "harm" Is necessarily indirect. In
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However, contrary to Pacific Lumber's arguments, the Sweet Home Court did not require evidence
that habitat modification would directly harm a
species; quite the opposite-the court affirmed that
a take may occur indirectly. Further, the court clearly stated that a habitat modifying activity must be
the proximate cause of harm to the species. Under
this standard, future harm only need be reasonably
foreseeable, not absolutely certain. In light of this, a
plaintiff should only be required to show that it is
more likely than not that habitat modification will
significantly impair species breeding, feeding and
sheltering activities. 108
The district court's findings in the Marbled
Murrelet case are more than sufficient to establish
that Pacific Lumber's proposed harvest of old
growth redwood trees will actually harm the murrelet through significant impairment of its essential
behavior patterns. The court found that the harvesting of the murrelet's critical nesting habitat "will
result in a high probability that the remaining population of marbled murrelets in [the Owl Creek]
region will become extinct," and that the survivability
of the murrelet population in Owl Creek is important to the survivability of the entire California population. 0 9 The court also found that "logging activities ... will result in the destruction and degradation
of occupied habitat such that marbled murrelets will
actually be killed or injured by the logging operations."i 0 That the actual injury requirement was
met in the Marbled Murrelet case is further illustrated
by the kind of injury necessary to satisfy that test, as
discussed below.
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3. What kind of injury justifies a finding of actual
harm?
Another open question after Sweet Home is the
nature and extent of injury necessary to invoke the
"actual injury" requirement. Although it is clear that

the death of an existing, individual protected animal
falls within the harm regulation's permissible scope,
it is not clear to what extent other,,lesser forms of
injury (such as impairment of species breeding,
feeding and sheltering) may properly be proscribed.
While the regulation on its face defines "actual
injury" to include impairment of a species' essential
behavioral patterns such as breeding, feeding and
sheltering, the degree of impairment must be significant."Ii As the preamble to the final harm regulation
states, "[dleath or injury may be caused by impairment of essential behavioral patterns which can
have significant and permanent effects on listed
species."' 12 The question thus turns on the degree of
behavioral impairment required in order to satisfy
the actual injury standard and the proper interpretation of "significant and permanent effects." Is harm
to species' recovery sufficient to satisfy the actual
harm limitation? Or is a decline in the population
and death of individual members of the species
required? If so, is any decline in numbers sufficient,
or must the activity also pose a risk of extinction?
Under one interpretation, the majority opinion
in Sweet Home can be read to imply that only activities posing a risk of extinction will meet the actual
injury requirement." 3 However, it is unwise to second guess the meaning of statements made in
dicta, as they are simply illustrative examples, and
do not necessarily indicate the Court's view of the
permissible scope of the regulation. Arid again, it is
important to remember that the Court was only
addressing the propriety of the regulation in the
context of a facial challenge. Further, the Sweet Home
majority clearly indicates that indirect forms of
injury to a species could violate the take prohibition
(such as impairment of essential behavioral patterns), but otherwise provides no guidance as to the
kind and extent of indirect injuries thai would qualify under the statute.

Sweet Home. the Supreme Court approved the indusion in
the regulation of habitat modification but did so only
because the Court read the regulation to require actual
injury or death to individual members of the particular
species at issue. The district courts findings of indirect
harm in this case-through "impaired" breeding and
possibly increased predation-are not sufficient to meet

from -preponderance of the evidence" to "clear and convincing
evidence* or even "beyond a reasonable doubt." There is no basis
or precedent for such a high standard of proof In § 9 cases,
109. Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 880 F.Supp, at 1366
(emphasis added).
110. Id.

this test.
Even if it were shown ... that murrelets nested in the
[proposed timber harvestl area. no individual marbled
murrelet would be iniured or killed by a harvest when
those birds are not present in the stand.... "[llmpaired
breeding" is, at best, a potential or possible consequence of the harvesting of trees, and therefore ... not

actionable under the ESA.
Appellants Opening Brief at 19, 22, 29.
108. In effect, Pacific Lumber's argument changes the standard of proof required in a case involving the harm regulation

111. 50 C.E.R. § 17.3.

112. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (1981),
113. See, e.g., Sweet Home, 115 S,Ct. at 2414 ("Irlespondents
ask us to invalidate the IUSFWS'j understanding of 'harm' In
every circumstance, even when an actor knows that an activity,

such as draining a pond, would actually result inthe extinction of a
listed species by destroying its habitat"); Id.at 2414 n.15 ("lulnder

the dissent's interpretation of the Act, a developer could drain a
pond, knowing that the act would extinguish an endangered

species of turtles, without even proposing a conservation plan or
applying for a permit under j§ 10(a)l") (emphasis added).

Vint 1996

Winier 1996

The concurring and dissenting opinions contain a more thorough analysis of what these justices
believe constitutes injury in the context of habitat
modification. Justice O'Connor agrees that impairment of essential behavioral patterns through habitat modification can constitute actual inlury.i1 4 She
explains:
To raze the last remaining ground on which
the piping plover currently breeds, thereby
making it impossible for any piping plovers to
reproduce, would obviously injurethe population (causing the species' extinction in a
generation). But by completely preventing
breeding, it would also injure the individual living bird, in the same way that sterilizing the creature injures the individual living bird... One need not subscribe to theories of "psychic harm" ... to recognize that
to make it impossible for an animal t reproduce is to impair its most essential physical functions and to render that animal.
and its genetic material, biologically obsolete. This, in my view, is actual injury.'i1
It is unclear whether Justice O'Connor believes
that habitat modification that interferes with a
species' breeding behavior satisfies the actual
injury requirement only if it completely prevents
breeding and is therefore certain to cause the
species' extinction (or at least a substantial decline
in the population), or whether she was simply using
an extreme example in an attempt to discredit the
dissent's analysis.
The dissent opines that habitat modificationwhich interferes' with a species' breeding behavior
can never result in actual injury to a particular animal, but can only harm populations of species and
"hypothetical" individual animals by causing them
not to come into being.i 6 In Justice Scalia's view,
"impairment of breeding" can only injure individual
animals if one believes that the harm regulation
encompasses injuries that are not physical in
nature:
114.Id. at 2419 ('Iblreeding, feeding and sheltering are what
animals do. Ifsignificant habitat modification, by interfering with
these essential behaviors, actually kills or Injures an animal protected by the Act, it causes 'harm' within the meaning of the regulation') (O'Connor, j., concurring).

115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 2422 (Scalia, J.. dissenting).
117.Id. at 2430 n.5 (emphasis in original). This viewpoint Is

of course completely at odds with basic biology, common sense.
and every court decision that has interpreted the harm regulation. As justice O'Connor points out:'[o]ne need not subscribe to
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[Slurely the only harm to the individual
animal from impairment of that "essential
function" is not-the failure of issue (which
harms only the issue), but the psychic harm
of perceiving that it will leave this world
with no issue (assuming, of course, that
the animal in question, perhaps an endangered species of a slug, is capable of such
painful sentiments). If it includes that psychic harm, then why not the psychic harm
of not being able to frolic about-so that
the draining of a pond used for an endangered animals' recreation, but in no way
essential to its survival, would be prohibit7
ed by the Act?ii

Neither the concurring nor dissenting Justices
apparently believe that habitat modification which
impairs essential behavioral patterns in a manner
which prevents or impedes a species' recovery
would satisfy-the actual injury limitation. As Justice
O'Connor explains: "Itlhata protected animal could
have eaten the leaves of a fallen tree or could, perhaps, have fruitfully multiplied in its branches is not
sufficient under the regulation. Instead ... the regulation requires demonstrable effect (i.e. actual
injury or death) on actual, individual members of
the protected species."'s
The concurring and dissenting Justices' view of
what constitutes actual injury is in contrast to that
of the Ninth Circuit. In NationalWildlife Federation, the
Ninth Circuit rejected the view that the injury sustained to a species must pose a threat of extinction,
reasoning that "ItIhis would be contrary to the spirit of the statute, whose goal of preserving threatened and endangered species can also be achieved
through incremental steps."" 9 In fact, the court
noted, a finding of harm is justified where habitat
degradation causes injury that "prevents, or possibly, retards, recovery of the species." 2 0 The district
court opinion in the second Palila case also found
that degradation of the Palila's critical habitat "is
actually, presently injunng the Palila by decreasing
food and resting sites so that the Palila population
is suppressed to its current critically endangered
theories of 'psychic harm' ...
to recognize that to make it impossible for an animal to reproduce Is ...
actual injury.' 115 S. Ct. at
2419.
118. Id.at 2419 (O'Connor. I..
concumng).
119. 23 F3d at 1512 n.8.
120. Id.at 1513; accord Fort Conservaion Cauncil,50 F3d at 788

nA.Although the Ninth Circuit has never been required to pass
directly upon the Issue of whether harm to recovery is actionable
under § 9.this dicta nevertheless provides a clear indication of
how the court would rule if faced with the fssue.
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levels. If the Mouflon continue eating the mamane
forest, the forest will not regenerate and the Palila
population will not recover to a point where it can
be removed from the endangered species list. Thus,
the presence of mouflon sheep ... threatens the
continued existence and the recovery of the Palila
2
species."1i
The Ninth Circuit's approach to the actual
injury clearly makes the most sense. If complete
impairment of breeding injures an individual living
creature, why wouldn't a.lesser form of impairment
of breeding which prevents the species from recovering also actually injure that creature? 122 Indeed,
the very purpose of the ESA is to "conserve" threatened and endangered species. 123 "To conserve" is
specifically defined as the use of all methods and
procedures necessary to bring the species to the
point of full recovery. 124 Why then, in the words of"
the district court in Palila, 25 should a species have
to "dip closer to extinction" in order for the section
9 prohibition to come into force? 126 Requiring a
showing of complete impairment of a species'
essential behavior necessitates a showing of a substantial threat or certainty of extinction, contrary to
the express purposes of the ESA. It unjustifiably
places the burden on the species to demonstrate its
right to survive and reads the term "harm" out of the
take prohibition altogether by requiring evidence of
certain death of individual members of the species
(see further discussion of proof of harm below).
Moreover, the line between what constitutes harm
to a species' chances of recovery and a species'
1 27
prospects of survival is often indeterminably thin.
Therefore, it is often difficult to determine when
habitat modification will threaten a species' continued existence versus when it will "simply" threaten
its recovery prospects. For these reasons, the take
prohibition should not distinguish between activi-

ties that jeopardize a species' chances of survival
and those that impair its chances of recovering to
non-endangered levels.

121. 649 F Supp at 1080 (emphasis in original).
122. See Id.("Itlhis significant habitat degradation is actually
presently injunng the Palila by decreasing food and nesting sites, so
that the Palila population is suppressed to its current critically
endangered levels").

ber of an endangered or threatened species"); Id.at 2415 ("the
Government cannot enforce the section 9 prohibition until an animal has actually been killed or iniured") (emphasi added),
129. Id.at 2418 ("the challenged regulation Is limited to significant habitat modification that causes actual death or Injury
to identifiable protected animals", "Illn my view, the regulation Is
limited by its terms to actions that actually kill or injure Individual
animals"); id.at 2419 ("the regulation requires demonstrable effect .,
on actual, individual members of the protected species"); Id.at 2420
("the 'harm' regulation applies where significant habitat modifi-

123. 16 U.S.C. § 153 1(b).

124. 16 US.C. § 1532(3).
125. 649 F.Supp. 1070.
126. Id. at 1077.

127. Id. at 1080;

Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. Nat'l Marine

Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 894 (D. Or. 1994).
128. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2412 ("we must assume arguen-

do that ... as a consequence [of plaintiffs' logging activitiesl, members of [an endangeredl species will be killed or injured"); id.at
2414 n. 13 ("ltlhe dissent incorrectly asserts that the Iharml regulation ... fails to require injury to particularanimals"); id. at 2414
("no one could seriously request an 'incidental' take permit to
avert section 9 liability for direct, deliberate action against a mem-

4. How may actual harm through habitat modification
be proven?
After Sweet Home, it is also unclear whether the
harm regulation must be read to require proof of
death or injury to specific, identifiable members of
a species or whether harm may be established by
proof of harm to the population as a whole. While
the majority opinion does refer to "particular animals" and "members" of the species, 28 these references cannot reasonably be read to address the
issue of how harm may be proven. Rather, the references reflect the Court's understanding of the fact
that section 9 protects individual animals, not just
entire populations. Justice O'Connors concurring
opinion, however, indicates that she reads the
USFWS harm regulation to require proof of harm to
specific, identifiable individual animals in order to
establish a "take " 129 Justices Scalia, Rehnquist and
Thomas also would limit the regulation in this manner.130
This "individual animals" proof issue creates an
interesting paradox. On the one band, in the
abstract, it would appear that a prohibition against
harm to an individual animal is a more stringent
standard than a prohibition against harm to an
entire population. This conclusion reflects section
9's more protective focus on individual animals, as
compared with section 7's focus on jeopardy to the
species as a whole.i 3i Thus, if an entira population
has been harmed, one can logically infer that individual members of the species necessarily have
been harmed as well. 2 2 For this reason, proof of
harm to a population is a legitimate means of
establishing harm to individual animals through

cation ... causes actual death or injury to identifiable animals")
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
130. Id.at 2422, 2430-31 (Scalia, J.dissenting).
13 1.Frederick Cheever, An Introduction to the ProhibitionAgainst
Takings insection 9 of the EndangeredSpecies Act of 1973 Learning to Live
With a Powerful Species Preservation Law, 62 U. CoL., L. R 109, 176

(1991).
132. See Sierra Club v.Lyng, 694 F.Supp. 1260, 1270-71 (ED.
Tex. 1988), aff'd. Sierra Club v.Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991)
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circumstantial evidence. This is consistent with the

standard for granting.an exception to the take prothe
hibition under 10(a),1 33 which is essentially 34
equivalent of the section 7 jeopardy standard. If
one's entitlement to a permit for incidental take of
species is established by proof that the population
as a whole will be protected, then one should likewise be able to establish that an unlawful take has
occurred by proving that the population has been
harmed.
On the other hand, if the Sweet Home opinion is
read to mean that harm may only be established by
proof of death or injury to specific, identifiable individual animals, this could lead to the absurd consequence that even an activity causing a species' population to decline would not be a "take" unless the
corpses of individual animals were produced or
there was no other occupied habitat remaining. It is
very difficult to prove that harm has befallen or
would befall specific, individual animals absent evidence of a dead body or evidence that the activity at
issue would raze the last remaining habitat of the
species, causing it to go extinct (as was the case in
T.VA v. Hill). Without around-the-clock evidence of
an individual animal's behavior, such as breeding,
feeding and sheltering, it would be extremely difficult to determine whether an activity was impairing
or would impair that behavior. 135 In sum, it is much
more difficult to prove that an dentifiable individual
has been or would be harmed by a particular activity than it is to establish that the activity is causing
or would cause an overall decline in the species'
population.
The error of interpreting section 9 to require
proof of death or injury to individual members of
the species is severalfold. First, as just explained,
such an interpretation de facto requires proof of
direct harm to the species, similar to the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision and the dissenting opinion Sweet Home, and contrary to the clear
direction in the majority opinion. As the Sweet Home
majority pointed out, "unless the statutory term
'harm' encompasses indirect as well as direct
('lilt is uncontested that a severe decline in the population of
woodpeckers has occurred in the past ten years. 'Harm' does not
necessarily require proof of the death of specific or Individual
members of the species [citing the Palia casesl. ... but as the
numbers show themselves, large percentages of the few remaining birds have died").
133. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (an incidental take permit
will be granted if. among other things, it "does not appreciably
reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species
in the wild').
134. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 835. USEWS regulations define "to
jeopardize the continued existence of" as "to engage In an action
that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce
appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a list-
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injuries, the word has no meaning that does not
duplicate the meaning of the other words [in the
definition] of 'take'.""
Second, a requirement that a section 9 violation be established through proof of death or injury
to identifiable individual animals is inconsistent
with both the plain language of the statute and the
overall purposes of the ESA. Such a crabbed interpretation ironically turns section 9, with its more
protective focus on harm to individual members of
a listed species, into the poor stepchild of section 7,
with a less protective focus on jeopardy to entire
populations of species. In fact, such an interpretation
of section 9 may render that section even less protective of species than section 7, allowing the former provision to be invoked only when an entire
population faces certain extinction (or an individual
member of a species will be killed directly). Section
7, on the other hand, merely requires proof that an
activity is reasonably expected to reduce the likelihood of
the species' survival and recovery 37 The potential
for distortion of the purpose of section 9 is illustrated by the illogical holding in North Slope Borough
v.Andrus, wherein the court held that the proposed
offshore oil leasing activity would jeopardize the
continued existence of the entire species, but would
not result in a take of an individual member of that
species. 138
Third, a restrictive interpretation of section 9
improperly nullifies the section 10(a)(2) and 7(b)(4)
incidental take permit processes. 39 As explained in
footnote 54, section 10(a)(2) contains a limited
exception to section 9's stringent take prohibition.
Section 10(a)(2) authorizes the USFVS to issue a
permit allowing a landowner to take individual
members of a species as incident to an otherwise
lawful activity. A so-called "incidental take" permit
may be issued if.
inter alia, the activity will not
"appreciably reduce the species likelihood of survival and recovery in the wild: which is the equiva40
lent of the section 7 -jeopardy- standardi
Significantly, the incidental take permit process was
enacted to address the "concerns of private
ed species Inthe wild." 50 C.R. § 402.02.

135. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 22. Marbled Murreletv.
Pacific Lumber Co.. No. 16504 (9th CiL 1995) (ilmpaired breeding' might result Inf r cr Eirds. but it would not result in the'actu-

al Injury' to 'particular animals" required to establish a section 9
violation').
136. Swatl
Hom. 115 S. Ct. at 2413.
137.50 C.MP,. § 402.02.
138.486 .Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1979): see afso California v. watt.
520 . Supp. 1359 (CD. Cal. 1981); Morrill v. Lulan. 802 E Supp.
424 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
139. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(bJ(4). 1539(aJ(l1(B).
140. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(aj(2)(B)iv): H.R. Rep. No. 567. at 31
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landowners who are faced with having otherwise
lawful actions ...
prevented by the section 9 prohi41
bitions against taking."'
Section 7(b)(4) contains a similar process for
authorizing incidental take in conjunction with the
federal consultation process under section 7(a)(2).
Congress recognized that, even an activity which
would not jeopardize the continued existence of a
species in violation of section 7 still could result in
the take of individual members of that species in
violation of section 9 142For this reason, Congress
authorized the USFWS to issue an "incidental take
statement" to a federal agency or federal permit or
license applicant if the taking would not jeopardize
the continued existence of the species as a
whole. 143 Section 7(o) provides that any taking in
compliance with the terms and conditions of an
incidental take statement is not a violation of section 9.144
The fact that a permit to take a species will be
granted under section 10(a)(2) if the activity will not
jeopardize the species' continued existence necessarily means that Congress intended the take prohibition to be substantially more stringent than the
jeopardy standard. Likewise, the fact that Congress
recognized that a take could still occur even in the
absence of a jeopardy determination under section 7(a)(2),
and was therefore compelled to enact a procedure
authorizing such take under sections 7(b)(4) and
7(o), also means that the take prohibition is much
stricter than the jeopardy threshold.
This is the only interpretation that gives effect
to Congress' inclusion of a "no jeopardy floor" in
sections lO(a)(2) and 7(b)(4) as a "safety valve"
release from the restrictive application of the take
prohibition. If the section 9 take prohibition is interpreted to be less restrictive than the section 7 jeopardy standard (through imposition of highly uncertain "individual animal" proof requirements, a
requirement of proof of certain extinction, or other-

wise), then these permit processes would be nonsensical and superfluous. This is because the take
prohibition would not be violated until after the
jeopardy floor had been exceeded, and therefore
there would be no legal requirement to obtain such
permits in the first instance.

("the legislation establishes a procedure whereby those persons
whose actions may affect endangered or threatened species may
receive permits for the incidental taking of such species if the
action would not ieopardize the continued existence of the
species"); see also House Conf. Rep. No. 97-835, at 29 (1982).
141. H.R. Rep. No. 567, at 31.
142. H.R. Rep. No. 835, at 27 ("Iflederal agencies that
receive favorable biological opinions which conclude that the
agency action would not violate section 7(a)(2) remain subject to
the section 9 prohibition against taking individual specimens of
endangered or threatened species of fish or wildlife"); H.R. Rep.
No. 567, at 26 ("ltlhe purpose of the Section 7(b)(4) and the
amendment to Section 7(o) is to resolve the situation in which a
Federal agency or a permit or license applicant has been advised
that the proposed action will not violate Section 7(a)(2) of the
IESAI but the proposed action will result in the taking of some
species Incidental to that action-a clear violation of Section 9 of
the [ESAI which prohibits any taking of a species. The Federal

agency or permit or license applicant Is then confronted with the
dilemma of having a biological opinion which permits the activity to proceed but is, nevertheless, proscribed from Incidentally
taking any species even though the incidental taking was contemplated in the biological opinion and determined not to be a
violation of Section 7(a)(2)").
143. 16 U.S.C. 1536(b)(4): H.R. Rep, No. 567, at 26. House
Rep. No. 97-835, at 27.
144. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o).
145. National Wildlife Fed'n,
23 E3d at 1513.
146. Sweet Home. 115 S. Ct. at 2414.
147. Id.at n.13.
148. Id.at 2412 n.9 (cnminal violations of the act are general rather than specific intent crimes), Id.at 2414 ('Congress" addition of the section 10 permit provision supports the Secretary's
conclusion that activities not Intended to harm an endangered

5. What extent of habitat modification justifies a finding
of actual harm?
Finally, there is the question of l'ow extensive
habitat modification must be in order to trigger the
take prohibition. The USFWS harm regulation
defines harm to include only significant habitat modification. The Ninth Circuit has affirmed this limitation. 145 The Supreme Court has likewise stated that
"activities that cause minimal ...
harm will not violate the [ESA as construed in the 'harm' regulation." 46 It is unclear what is "insignificant" or "minimal" harm. But since the Court has also stated that
"every term in the regulation's definition of 'harm' is
subservient to the phrase 'an act which actually kills
or injures wildlife'," 47 it is safe to assume that habitat modification which results in actual death or
injury is, by definition, significant within the meaning of the harm regulation (regardless of the extent
of the area adversely affected or destroyed), and
vice versa.
C. Other Issues
There are two remaining issues regarding the
proper interpretation of the take proiibition with
respect to habitat modification. The first question
pertains to the state of mind necessary to establish
a "taking" through habitat modification. The majority in Sweet Home clarified that, at least in cases
involving criminal and most civil penalties, a person
need not specifically intend to harm an endangered
species in order to be liable under section 9.148
Rather, the person need only intend the act that
results in harm to the species. This interpretation is
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consistent with Congress' substitution, in the 1978
amendments to the ESA, of the term "knowingly" for
"willfully" in the criminal and the higher civil penal-

ty provision of the ESA.1 49
The Court's opinion does not address the state
of mind required to establish a section 9 violation
in the context of an action for injunctive relief.
However, it is sigfiificant that the harm regulation
itself contains no intent requirement. Moreover,
"with the exception of the provisions authorizing
fines and criminal penalties, which require 'knowing' violations, nothing in the IESA itself indicates
that a violator must know [ofl or intend" to violate
.thelaw. 50 Nor should courts read such a requirement into the act. In fact, there should be no mens
rea requirement for purposes of obtaining injunctive
relief under the ESA. In T.V.A. v. Hill, the Supreme
Court enjoined an action which would result in

harm to an endangered species without any showing of intent. Requiring a plaintiff to prove that an
actor knows that his or her action will result in a
prohibited impact on an endangered or threatened
species would place an undue burden on plaintiffs
and would be contrary to both the letter and the
spirit of the ESA.i5i
The second issue -iswhether a failure to act or
an omission can ever be a taking. The final notice of
the harm regulation states that use of the term "act"
in the regulation is intended to be inclusive of both
commissions and omissions. 152 Although this issue
was-not addressed in the Sweet Home majority opinion, the USFWS' decision to include omissions
within the regulation's scope was one of the three
key reasons put forth by the dissenters for invalidating the regulation. 5 3
One district court has held explicitly that a failure to act violates the take prohibition. In Sierra Club
v. Lyng. 54 plaintiffs challenged the United States
Forest Service's (USFS's) forest management practices as a-taking of the endangered red-cockaded
species, such as habitat modification, may constitute unlawful
takings'); Id.at 2415 ('to the extent the ID.C. Circuit] court read a
requirement of intent or purpose into the words used to define
'take, it ignored section 9's express provision that a 'knowing'
action is enough to violate the IESAI'). 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(1) and
(b)(1) provide that anyone who "knowingly violates" any provision
of the ESA is subject to specified civil and criminal penalties. 16
U.S.C. § 1540(a)(I) provides that any person who "otherwise violates" any provision of the ESA is subject to a civil penalty of not
more than $500.
149. H.R. Rep. No. 1625.95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 1804. 95th Cong.. 2d Sess. 26. Although not at Issue in
the case, the Court did imply that it might be inclined to read the
term "knowingly" into the "otherwise violates" civil penalty provision in § 1540(a)(1). The Court stated that the provision is "potentially sweeping." and that it has "imputed scienter requirements
to criminal statutes that impose sanctions without expressly
requiring scienter." Sweet Home, 115 S. CL at 2412 n.9. However.
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woodpecker. In its findings of fact, the court stated
that the causes of the woodpeckers' decline included the USFS' failure to: (1) control hardwood midstory encroachment on pine trees which the woodpeckers used for nesting and foraging; (2) employ
prescribed burning to control encroachment of
young pines and hardwood trees; (3) provide an
appropriate basal area in potential nesting stands;
and (4) identify and preserve old growth trees
appropriate for nesting. The court held that such
failures to act, considered in conjunction with other
USFS forest management practices and policies
(namely clearcutting). amounted to a taking of the
woodpeckers in violation of section 9. This holding,
however, may in part reflect the court's understanding of the federal government's affirmative duty to
conserve endangered and threatened species under
section 7(a)(l).'5
Ill. Conclusion: An Appeal To Uphold the Original
Intent of the ESA
If an unduly restrictive reading of the term
"harm" is adopted, this will completely fail to effectuate Congress' intent in enacting the ESA. to provide a means for conserving (i.e. recovering) endangered and threatened species and the habitats
upon which they depend for survival.i56 There is no
escaping the biological fact that species cannot survive without habitat. As a recent National Academy
of Sciences report concluded: "if habitat is substantially reduced in area or degraded, species occurring
in the wild will be lost.""57 Thus, any incremental
destruction of habitat will have a cumulative
adverse impact on a species' chances of survival.
Viewed in this context, there can be no de minimus
destruction of habitat. As long as we continue to
lose species' habitat, we will continue to see a
decline in our nation's biodiversity. Thus, because
the biological reality is that any species depends on
the Court said. the proper case to consider whether to do so
would be a challenge to enforcement of that proasion itself. Id.
150. Cheever. supra note 13 Pat 189.
151. See als United States v. Nguyen. 916 F.2d 1016. 1018 (5th
dr. 1990) (violation of ESA is a general Intent crime. prosecution
need not prove that the defendant knew species was endangered
or threatened or that it was illegal to take such species).
152.46 Fed. Reg. 54.748. 54.750 (1981).
153. Sirt Home. 115 S. Ct. at 2422.
154.694 F.Supp. 1261 (E.D.Tex 1988). affd. inpart. re/d.inart
on aftergmunds.. Sierra Club v. Yeutter 926 F2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
155. 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(1); see Lyng. 694 ESupp. at 1270.
156. 16 US.C. 1531(b).
157. NAmoA.L ResEARcH COu:sC.. SaEwC= AD TE
h Eutoi£oma
SPmiEs Acr 5 (1995).
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habitat to survive, species cannot be artificially separated from their habitat through fine legal distinctions which fail to take into account this reality.
Congress has already made the hard- policy
choice: that protecting biodiversity is a goal that is
important enough to outweigh other societal goals,
including unrestricted economic development. 58
In enacting the ESA, Congress recognized that
species protection is not an easy or a simple matter,
and that it often requires our society to make hard
choices and sacrifices. Nevertheless, Congress
required these choices and sacrifices to be made.159
What the cries for a "balanced interpretation" of the
ESA fail to recognize is that species would not be
endangered or threatened if the scales had not
already been heavily tipped against them. The very
definition of "endangered" means that the species
is on the brink of extinction and that even incremental adverse impacts can have a serious impact
on the species' chances of survival. 6° A narrow
reading of the take prohibition, however, essentially sanctions a game of russian roulette with our
nation's imperiled species, contrary to congressional intent. By erecting numerous legal obstacles to
protection from harm, such a reading unlawfully
places the burden on the species to demonstrate its
right to survive, when in fact, given its precarious
condition, all presumptions should be in the
species' favor.
Now, on the eve of reauthorization of the ESA,
we as a nation have another policy decision to
make. We must either decide to do what it takes to
meet the ESA's goal of protecting our nation's priceless biodiversity, or we must determine that loss of
biodiversity is an inevitable consequence of everincreasing economic development that simply must
be tolerated. This policy choice cannot and should
not be made by the courts, through an increasingly
narrow interpretation of the take prohibition.
Rather, this is a legislative decision, and unless and
until Congress speaks to this issue again, the courts
are obligated to effectuate Congress' intent as
reflected in the current ESA.

158. T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 194 ('congress has spoken in
the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance
has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the
highest of priorities").
159. George C. Coggin, Snail Dartersand Pork BarrelsRevisited:
Reflections on EndangeredSpecies and Land Use in America, in BALANCING
ON THE BRINK OF EXTiNCTION: THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND

LESSONS FOR THE FuTuRE 64 (Kathryn Kohm ed., 1990).
160. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) ("endangered species" means a
species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range).
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